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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
IN CALIFORNIA
Since the end of World War II, regional and community shopping
centers' have enjoyed such phenomenal growth that they are now estab-
lished and accepted fixtures in both the American economic and social
communities.2 Along with the labyrinth of retail stores, recreational
facilities and consumer services that it brings to the surrounding com-
munity, the shopping center brings some significant new problems that
have not yet been fully explored by the courts. One such problem is
whether the remedy of specific performance is available for a tenant's
breach of a covenant to remain in business within the shopping center.
Those few cases that have decided the point are in conflict, 3 and the
courts have established no clear guidelines on what may be expected
in the future. A case has never arisen in California, but the continual
growth of shopping centers throughout the state suggests that a Cali-
fornia court may be faced with the problem in the near future.
Characteristics of Shopping Centers
A shopping center is a quasi-cooperative enterprise, composed of
a number of nationally and locally known retail stores, deliberately
chosen by the developer to provide complete consumer service.' The
center will normally include one or more "key tenants"; these will
usually be nationally organized chain stores having an established mer-
chandising power.5 Each store or collection of comparable stores not
only serves a definite, planned function within the shopping center,
1. Regional shopping centers will normally contain at least 300,000 square feet
of leasable area, and may contain in excess of one million square feet. Such a center
will be located on 30 or more acres of land, and requires a supporting population of no
less than 150,000 people. A community shopping center is proportionately smaller,
containing less than 300,000 square feet of leasable area, and supported by a surround-
ing population of as little as 40,000 persons. There are also differences in the cate-
gories of stores that will be represented in the respective types of centers. Heming-
way, Selected Problems in Leases o1 Community and Regional Shopping Centers, 16
BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hemingway).
2. See V. GREUN & L. SMITH, SHOPPING TOWNS USA 20-24 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as GRUEN & SMITH]; S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES, PERCENTAGE, SHORT
AND LONG TERM 70 (5th ed. 1959); Hemingway at 1.
3. See text accompanying notes 27-46 infra.
4. See GRUEN & SMITH 191, 192.
5. Goldstein, Practical Aspects of Real Estate Developments: Illustrated by a
Shopping Center Project, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 119, 124 (1960); Hemingway
at 2; see GRUEN & SMITH 190-92.
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but also has an appeal to a particular class of customers. The com-
bined customer appeal, or "pulling power" of each of these stores con-
stitutes the strength of a shopping center. 6  Consequently, the success
of the center is in large part contingent on the success of each merchant
within its boundaries; the loss of any merchant diminishes the shopping
center's strength. The importance to the developer of this combined
pulling power is best exemplified by the sundry provisions of a shopping
center lease.
Percentage Leases
Shopping center leases are most commonly percentage leases, 7 un-
der which the lessee pays, in addition to a guaranteed minimum monthly
rent, a percentage of his stipulated monthly or annual gross sales.8
The guaranteed minimum rent may often be well below the fair rental
value of the property,' although lending institutions financing the
center will generally require that the rent be sufficient to meet the mort-
gage and operating expenses. 10 Usually, no percentage rent will be
due unless the lessee's sales exceed a specified minimum amount. This
form of lease has obvious advantages for both the lessor and the lessee."
6. See Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964); Brummond, Shopping Center Leases, 1 PRAc. LAw. 66 (Dec. 1955);
Hemingway 2; Pollack, Shopping Center Leases, 9 KAN. L. Rv. 379 (1961).
7. Colbourn, A Guide to Problems in Shopping Center Leases, pt. 1, 28 BROOK-
LYN L REv. 227, 238 (1962). See also Brummond, Shopping Center Leases, 1 PRAc.
LAw., 66, 68 (Dec. 1955); Hemingway at 12; Kranzdorf, Problems of the Developer,
1965 U. ILL. L.F. 173, 187.
8. See Colbourn, A Guide to Problems in Shopping Center Leases, pt. 1, 29
BROOKLYN L. REV. 56, 60, 70 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Colbourn, pt. II]. Provisions
in percentage leases vary widely and the percentage rental may be based on gross or
net profits, proceeds, receipts from the business, net income, or any comparable standard
that is mutually satisfactory to the parties. The commentators recommend a per-
centage of the gross sales as involving the least inherent difficulties. Id. at 58, 60, 70.
See Tulley, The Shopping Center Lease, in CALFORNIA LAND SECURrTY AND DEVELOP-
MENT 841, 852-53 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960) [hereinafter cited as Tulley].
9. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES, PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM
58 (5th ed. 1959); Hemingway at 13; Comment, The Lessee's Obligations Under a Per-
centage Lease, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 677 (1965); cf. M.N. Landau Stores, Inc. v. Daigle,
157 Me. 253, 170 A.2d 673 (1961). Where the actual value of the demised premises
is in doubt, a lessor may reduce or altogether omit the minimum rent provision to induce
aggressive businesses to share the risk of commencing operations in the location.
Landis, Problems in Drafting Percentage Leases, 36 B.U.L. REv. 190 (1956) [herein-
after cited as Landis].
10. Hemingway at 13. The terms of shopping center leases are of paramount im-
portance to the lending institutions, who must be consulted by the developer regarding
the caliber of tenants, length of the leases, minimum guaranteed rent, restrictive and
exclusive covenants, rights of assignment, etc. See Faletti, Financing the Shopping
Center, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 151, 164-70; Nichols, Setting Up a Shopping Center, in
CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 775, 801 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960).
11. Spreading the risks of the enterprise, permitting both the lessor and lessee to
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Unfortunately, it also has the inherent characteristic of making dam-
ages extremely difficult to calculate if the lease is breached, since future
sales must be estimated to determine the percentage rent for which the
lessee is liable.12
Restrictive Covenants and Exclusive Merchandising Rights
In addition, the complementary restrictive clauses and exclusive
merchandising rights13 in the typical shopping center lease make each
tenant dependent upon all other tenants. Thus, their single and col-
lective success is contingent in large measure on their continued coopera-
tion in energetically conducting business. 4 Such covenants normally
prevent a tenant from selling all but a specified category or generic line
of goods and guarantee that the premises in the shopping center will not
be leased to competing enterprises. Unless each retailer merchan-
dises those items that he has covenanted to merchandise, and refrains
from merchandising items included within another tenant's exclusive
right, the shopping center loses its integrated, balanced structure and
becomes nothing more than a conglomeration of independent retail
stores. 5 An unbalanced center may be little detriment to the na-
tionally organized chain stores who form the key tenants in most
shopping centers and represent the bulk of their pulling power, but the
effects would be far-reaching for those smaller merchants who fre-
quently depend on their exclusive merchandising rights to make partici-
pation in the shopping center profitable. 6
Additional clauses in a typical shopping center lease also evince
the cooperative character of the enterprise. Provisions are frequently
included for a merchants' association to coordinate the conduct of the
engage in relatively safe long-term leasing, and providing a safeguard against infla-
tion are but a few of its advantages. See Colbourn, pt. II, at 57-60; Hemingway at 11-13;
Landis at 190.
12. See S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES, PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG
TERM 79 (5th ed. 1959); Landis at 236.
13. For a discussion of the restrictive clauses and exclusive rights provisions
commonly found in shopping center leases, see Colbourn, pt. I1, at 70-78; Hemingway
at 19-24; Pollack, Outline of Clauses in a Shopping Center Lease, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SHOPPING CENTERS 39, 61-64 (Real
Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series Vol. I, 1968) [hereinafter cited as
Pollack, Outline]; Pollack, Shopping Center Leases, 9 KAN. L. REV. 379, 388-90 (1960);
Van Der Kamp & Crampton, Problems of the Tenant, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 202, 215-17.
14. Tulley at 844.
15. See GRUEN & SMITH 191-92; Pollack, Shopping Center Leases, 9 KAN. L.
REV. 379, 388 (1961).
16. This is especially true where the shopping center is not so large as to require
competing stores offering similar merchandise for sale in order to afford compara-
tive shopping. See Hildebrand v. Stonecrest Corp., 174 Cal. App. 2d 158, 344 P.2d 378
(1959); Flagg v. Andrew Williams Stores, Inc., 127 Cal. App. 2d 165, 273 P.2d
294 (1954).
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shopping center, including uniform business hours, sales, promotional
campaigns and the like. Both the lessor and the lessee may insist upon
reciprocal, noncompetition clauses within a given geographical radius.
Moreover, the lessor will frequently insist on retaining some control over
the manner in which the tenant conducts his business, how he displays
his merchandise, or advertises his store. All such provisions serve to
further illustrate the mutual dependence of the lessor and lessees among
themselves to insure a mutually successful enterprise.17
The Desirability of Specific Performance
It is of significant importance to shopping center participants that
they can rely on the courts to enforce these lease provisions, 18 and
thereby preserve the balanced structure established when the premises
were initially demised. Were such covenants unenforceable, the shop-
ping center phenomena would undoubtedly have been much less rapid
in its development.
But if a shopping center's success is dependent on observance by
the merchants of the provisions in their leases, it is no less contingent
on the continued use of the premises for the purpose for which they were
demised. Clearly, a business that has ceased to operate, or a building
that serves only as a warehouse or lies otherwise empty and unpro-
ductive, represents not only a loss of sales, which is the basis of the
percentage rent, but also a loss of the pulling power upon which each
of the other tenants in the shopping center relies. 19 Indeed, all parties
to the establishment of a shopping center must presuppose that, barring
unforeseen misfortune, the leased premises will be used for the duration
of the tenancy. Each tenant expects to profit from the customer traffic
generated by the combined pulling power of the other operating mer-
chants. Moreover, the developer selects the percentage lease, rather
than a lease for a shorter term- ° at a higher fixed rate,2' in part be-
17. For discussions of the numerous provisions commentators believe essential
to a shopping center lease, see GRUEN & SMITH 196-201; Colbourn, pl. II, 78-90; Hem-
ingway at 17-28; Pollack, Outline at 50-77.
18. E.g., Hildebrand v. Stonecrest Corp., 174 Cal. App. 2d 158, 344 P.2d 378
(1959); Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App. 2d 63, 291 P.2d 111 (1955); Meadowdale
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Meadowdale Lanes, Inc., 231 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. App. 1967)
(injunction); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Union Real Estate Co., 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 1 (C.P.
Allegheny County 1965) (injunction); see Pappadatos v. Market St. Bldg. Corp., 130
Cal. App. 62, 19 P.2d 517 (1933).
19. Landis at 231. See Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
20. See note 11 supra. By adjusting the rent to the lessee's sales, the lessor is af-
forded some protection against inflation. Absent this protection, the lessor must re-
duce the length of the tenancy, or otherwise make provisions to insure that he can
periodically increase the rent to match inflationary trends.
21. See Colbourn, pt. II, at 59; Hemingway at 17; Kranzdorf, Problems of the De-
veloper, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 173, 181-82.
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cause he expects to receive a substantial return on his investment through
the lessee's profitable business.
Nevertheless, the courts have been reluctant to impose upon the
lessee an obligation to remain in business against his will.22  Yet the
success of the shopping center, and the individual enterprises therein,
may very well depend on the lessor's ability to specifically enforce a
tenant's covenant to remain in business. This is especially true
where a key tenant ceases operation in the demised premises, either in
the exercise of sound business principles, 23 or merely to avoid paying
the increased percentage rent generated by a high volume of sales.24
Even though the lessee continues to pay the guaranteed minimum
monthly rent, the result is a deprivation to the lessor, and to the other
participants in the shopping center, of a business that was deliberately
included in the shopping center to increase its chances of success. In
such a case, in the face of an express covenant by the lessee to continue
in business until the term of the lease has expired, damages would
appear to be an inadequate remedy.25 Not only is there great difficulty
in estimating the loss of percentage rent, but it is almost impossible to
calculate the effects of lost patronage on the remaining stores in the
shopping center. In addition to diminishing the pulling power of the
center, a shuttered or vacant store is very likely to project an image of
financial instability,2" an intangible handicap which the shopping cen-
ter may find difficult to overcome. The net result may well be an
22. Percoff v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953); Hicks v. Whelan
Drug Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 110, 280 P.2d 104 (1955); Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951); Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45
Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941); Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 & 25¢ Stores, Inc.,
213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938); see Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377
Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954); cf. Hoops v. Tate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 486, 231 P.2d 560
(1951), where the court declined to imply a covenant that a married couple would re-
main as participants in a joint venture, despite the lessor's contention that in executing
the lease he had relied on the couple's business experience.
23. See, e.g., Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141,
113 P.2d 878 (1941), where the lessee was informed that he would be liable for sub-
stantial damages if he failed to vacate the premises at the end of the term, since the
new tenant wanted to occupy them as soon as possible.
24. See, e.g., Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964),
where lessee threatened to close what had been a successful market until he opened
competing stores in nearby locations, with the intent to pay only the minimum rent
on the abandoned premises. The court found, however, that this was not necessarily
inconsistent with sound business judgment.
25. Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384,
164 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1960); see American Bar Association, Report: Drafting
Shopping Center Leases, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF SHOPPING CENTERS 277, 295 (Real Estate Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series Vol. I, 1968 [hereinafter cited as ABA, Report].
26. Hemingway at 29.
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indeterminable loss of percentage rent to the developer from all other
lessees. In short, the shopping center adds a new dimension to dam-
ages: loss of potential sales to the shopping center, and loss of per-
centage rent based on those potential sales. Specific performance may
be the only available means of remedying such potential losses, es-
pecially where a key tenant seeks to avoid the obligations of his lease.
Approaches to This Problem in Other Jurisdictions
This problem was squarely presented to the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court in 1960, in the leading case of Dover
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc.2 7 Cushman had closed
his bakery, electing to pay the minimum rent of $7,000 per year, rather
than to continue operating a losing business. The lessor brought suit,
and Cushman appealed from a mandatory injunction that he reopen and
resume his business, maintain sales personnel, and display a sign. In
affirming the decree, the court held that a percentage rental agree-
ment in a shopping center is a unique instrument, and that the gravamen
of the developer's complaint was not only the loss of percentage rent,
but also the harm that would inevitably result from the withdrawal of
one of the members of the cooperative enterprise. The court found the
plaintiff's damages impossible to ascertain, the remedy at law accord-
ingly unsatisfactory, and specific performance therefore appropriate.
2 8
Although a landmark case, the decision was not a revolutionary
one for the New Jersey court, which has always been liberal in granting
specific performance.29  This liberal trend was recently evidenced in
Moorestown Management, Inc. v. Moorestown Bookshop, Inc.,30 where
the court, citing the Dover case with approval, indicated that it would
specifically enforce an affirmative covenant to join the merchant's asso-
ciation, remain a member for the duration of the lease, and pay the
requisite dues."
New Jersey, however, was not the first jurisdiction to compel
specific performance of a shopping center lease. In 1943, in Lincoln
27. 63 N.J. Super. 384, 164 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1960).
28. Id. at 394, 164 A.2d at-791. The decision was subsequently criticized in 22
U. Prrr. L. Rav. 789 (1961), the author contending that the court had extended the
equitable remedy too far. The conclusion may be valid in this particular case insofar as
there was no evidence that the lessee was of such importance to the shopping center
that the lessor could not find a satisfactory replacement tenant, in which case, plain-
tiff could have recovered for the loss of percentage rent in the interim.
29. E.g., Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc., I N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948)
(cooperative purchasing agreement); Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 462,
155 A. 544 (Ch. 1931) (construction contract).
30. 104 NJ. Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623 (App. Div. 1969).
31. Id. at 264, 249 A.2d at 631.
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Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co., " the Florida Supreme Court
indirectly enforced an express agreement to remain in business through-
out the year by enjoining the lessee from breaching his covenant. The
trial court had held that plaintiff's remedy was at law in an action for
damages. In reversing the decision, the supreme court relied on both
the inadequacy of the legal remedy, and the realization that the coven-
ant to remain in business was not only for the benefit of the lessor, but
for the benefit of all the tenants in the shopping center.3
The Problem of Judicial Supervision
Both the Florida and New Jersey decisions appear to extend equit-
able relief well beyond its historic limitation-that specific performance
will not be decreed where such performance would require judicial
supervision over a long period of time.34 The Florida decision, however,
did not consider the issue of judicial supervision, either because it was
not raised or because it was not considered controlling. In the Dover
case, the court not only stressed that since plaintiff had not requested it,
the decree did not provide for judicial supervision, 35 but expressly pro-
vided that the court would
make no direction with respect to the method of operating defend-
ant's business on the demised premises or to the quality of the
products sold and services rendered by the defendant there-
in .... 36
On this basis, the New Jersey court held that the difficulties of super-
vision were not so great as to prevent equitable relief, when compared
to the inadequacy of plaintiff's remedy at law.
Other courts, on the other hand, have considered the issue of super-
vision one of paramount importance. In Security Builders, Inc. v.
Southwest Drug Co.,37 the Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that
despite the dearth of cases treating the precise point, well-established
principles of equity dictated that the lessor's remedy was not in equity.',
The court, neglecting to discuss the adequacy of plaintiffs action at
32. 152 Fla. 542, 12 So. 2d 452 (1943).
33. Id. at 544, 12 So. 2d at 453. The court stated: "Another purpose in en-
forcing the covenant was to assure to all of the tenants the advantage of continued
business activity because a client or customer of any place of business in the locality
was a potential client . . . of all the others .... The interests of the landlord and
its tenants were ... inextricably bound together." Id.
34. See text accompanying notes 127-60 infra.
35. 63 N.J. Super. at 395, 164 A.2d at 791.
36. Id. (quoting the decree issued by the trial court).
37. 244 Miss. 877, 147 So. 2d 635 (1962). Lessee of a drug store and luncheon
counter in a shopping center gave notice of his intent to terminate his business after
having performed five years of a 10 year lease.
38. Id. at 885-86, 147 So. 2d at 639.
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law, concluded simply that
the principle ...seems to be well-settled ...that specific per-
formance of a provision in a lease-contract for the continued occu-
pancy and use of the premises by the lessee for a specified pur-
pose, and for a definite period of time, will not be ordered where
the continued operation of the business of the lessee would require
the superintendence of the court from time to time during the
period of the lease3 9
Plaintiff did not raise, nor did the court discuss, the issue presented in
the Dover case-whether specific performance would lie where there
was no plea for judicial supervision, but merely a plea for an order re-
quiring the tenant to resume his business.
A similar result was obtained in the New York case of Price v.
Herman.40 The plaintiff, relying on a covenant that expressly provided
that the lessor could enjoin any attempt by the lessee to cease operations,
brought suit to enjoin the defendant from removing his bakery business
from the premises. The defendant had moved to a larger building to
accommodate his expanding business but had continued to pay the fixed
rent on the premises. Denying plaintiff's plea, the court held:
Contracts which require the performance of varied and con-
tinuous acts, or the exercise of special skill, taste, and judgment,
will not, as a general rule, be enforced by courts of equity, be-
cause the execution of the decree would require such constant
superintendence as to make judicial control a matter of extreme
difficulty. 4
1
The court indicated that damages would be an adequate remedy in this
case,42 despite the plaintiff's contention that the tenant's departure
could result in the loss of the lessor's variance under a local zoning
ordinance. s
The courts are also reluctant to find an express duty on the part
of a lessee to continue conducting a business, especially where the
business is overtly unprofitable. 44 In Tulip Realty Co. v. City Products
39. Id.
40. 81 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 275 App. Div. 675, 87 N.Y.S.2d 221
(1949). The Price case involved neither a shopping center nor a percentage lease
agreement, and was therefore distinguished by these facts in the Dover case, 63 N.J.
Super. at 394, 164 A.2d at 791. Although these facts do make damages less difficult
to ascertain, the court denied specific performance primarily on the basis of the
difficulties of judicial supervision, and not on the adequacy of plaintiff's remedy at
law. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
41. 81 N.Y.S.2d at 362, quoting Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157
N.Y. 60, 66, 51 N.E. 408, 409 (1898).
42. Id. at 363.
43. Id. at 362.
44. In Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 203 La. 316, 14 So. 2d 581 (1943),
the court stated: "Of course, it was not incumbent upon [the lessee] to suffer a large
financial loss . . .by continuous and regular operation in the premises until the ex-
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Corp.,45 the Pennsylvania court refused to specifically enforce a coven-
ant to operate a variety store because the lease did not contain an express
provision that the lessee should continually use and occupy the premises
for the purpose for which it was leased. The court distinguished the
Dover case as one containing an express covenant, which the court indi-
cated would be an absolute prerequisite for any attempt by the lessor
to impose upon a reluctant tenant the obligation of continuing an un-
profitable enterprise.4 6
Percentage Lease Agreements in California
At the present time, California appears to be aligned with those
courts that have held specific performance of a shopping center lease
would violate the established tenet that equity will not act where en-
forcement of its decree would require prolonged judicial supervision"
or the exercise of special skill or knowledge.48  Nevertheless, the more
recent California decisions do evidence an intent to protect the interests
of the lessor by awarding damages where it is believed that the lessee
is not acting in good faith. 9 Consequently, a proper case could compel
the California courts to carefully reexamine their present attitude with
respect to granting equitable relief.
piration of the lease, merely for the sake of providing [the lessor] with [his] customary
rentals." Id. at 324, 14 So. 2d at 12.
45. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 629 (C.P. Phila. County 1961).
46. Id. at 632. The court found the applicable lease provisions to be in part as
follows: "The tenant agrees 'to use and keep the said premises for the retail sale,
storage or display of goods, wares and merchandise commonly sold in retail variety
stores in the Philadelphia area . . . and for no other purpose whatsoever' and that it is
'the tenant's intention to operate a retail variety store.'" Id. at 630. The lease also
provided for default "(c) If the premises shall be deserted or abandoned; (d) If
business operations for the purpose aforegoing described shall not be conducted therein
for fifteen (15) days after the landlord shall serve written notice of such situation."
Id. at 630-31. In addition, the lease provided: "'The tenant .. . shall open its store
for business within six (6) months after the date the store unit .. . is delivered ....
Tenant shall maintain on the premises a substantial stock of goods, wares and merchan-
dise and equipment, adequate to assure successful operation of the tenant's business.
Tenant shall keep the premises open and available for business activity therein during
all usual days and hours for such business in the vicinity and during such periods and
hours as are customary in shopping centers .... .' Id. at 631; accord, Dickey v.
Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954), which, although not
involving a shopping center, clearly had great influence on the court's holding. From
the lessor's viewpoint, both cases seem overly narrow in their interpretation of the
lease provisions. But see Simihawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d
49 (1964).
47. See Hunter v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. App. 2d 100, 97 P.2d 492 (1939).
48. See Crane v. Roach, 29 Cal. App. 584, 156 P. 375 (1916).
49. See Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
[Vol. 21
SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
No Damages Where Minimum Rent is Substantial
The original California position regarding percentage-lease busi-
ness tenancies, established in Cousins Investment Co. v. Hastings
Clothing Co.,50 was that there was no obligation on the part of the
lessee to remain in business on the demised premises in the absence
of an express covenant to the contrary, provided that the guaranteedminimum monthly rent reserved in the lease was a substantial, ade-
quate amount. In Cousins the court refused to imply a covenant to re-
main in business or to award damages for loss of percentage rent when
the lessee abandoned two months prior to the expiration of the term
and paid only the minimum rent for the remainder of the tenancy.51
Concluding that payment of the guaranteed minimum rent was con-
templated by the parties as an adequate return on the property, the
court noted that both the original lease and a carefully drawn amenda-
tory agreement contained no express covenant for continual operation.
2
After stating the rules for implied covenants, 53 the court concluded that
an express agreement to remain in business was intentionally omitted
by the parties,54 and that the defendant was therefore not liable in dam-
ages for any resultant loss to the lessor.
Using the criterion of a substantial, guaranteed minimum rent as a
starting point, the case of Masciotra v. Harlow5 expanded the doctrine
to hold that no convenant would be implied where the lease was for a
new business, the revenue from which neither party could accurately
estimate.5 6 In Masciotra, the defendant had opened a restaurant on
the premises that he had leased from the plaintiff. When it became a
success, he opened a competing restaurant in the immediate vicinity.
He transferred the experienced staff to the competing restaurant, which
was given the same name as the earlier restaurant. The defendant
continued to operate a restaurant on the plaintiff's premises as well, but
due to the competition, it failed to produce sufficient sales to require
payment of percentage rent under the terms of the lease. Relying on
50. 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941).
51. id. at 149, 113 P.2d at 882.
52. id. at 153, 113 P.2d at 884.
53. "[TIhe rule ... controlling the exercise of judicial authority to insert implied
covenants may be stated as follows: (1) the implication must arise from the language
used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) it must
appear from the language used that it was so clearly within the contemplation of the
parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be
justified on the grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it
can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made if attention had been called to
it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where the subject is completely covered by
the contract." Id. at 149, 113 P.2d at 882.
54. Id. at 153, 113 P.2d at 884.
55. 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951).
56. Id. at 380, 233 P.2d at 589.
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the rule laid down in Cousins v. Hastings, the court held that the de-
fendant was not liable to the lessor in damages for the loss of the per-
centage rent.
57
It is noteworthy, however, that in the Masciotra case the lease
contained a covenant that the business created on the plaintiffs premises
would remain the sole property of the lessee, who reserved the right to
carry it on " 'at any other place or places after the end or sooner termi-
nation of the . . . [lease.' "58 In addition, the lease contained an
express provision against competition by the lessor, while no such re-
striction appeared with respect to the lessee. Construing the lease as a
whole, the court concluded that the parties had not intended that the
lessee be bound to make the premises mutually profitable for both
parties, and that a guaranteed minimum rent of $250 per month
was a substantial minimum rent. The percentage rent, the court in-
dicated, was in the nature of a bonus, to which the lessor would be
entitled only if the lessee's business exceeded his expectations.59
Masciotra was followed in Hicks v. Whelan Drug Co.,60 where the
lessee covenanted to operate a drug store on the premises with the
"privilege" of also operating a fountain and lunch counter. In addition
to a guaranteed minimum monthly rent, the lessee was to pay a per-
centage of the gross sales of the entire store. When the lessee closed the
fountain and lunch counter, plaintiff brought suit for damages and an
injunction. Both pleas were denied on the basis that there was no ex-
press covenant to remain in business and that the contract was for a
new enterprise. 61 Unable to prove actual loss or to show that the oper-
ation of the lunch counter or utilization of the area for the sale or display
of merchandise would increase the tenant's gross sales, plaintiff was left
without a remedy.
Thus, it appears well-settled in California that in either a new or
established enterprise, in the absence of an express covenant to stay in
business, the lessee will not be held liable for the loss of percentage
rent whenever the court concludes that the guaranteed minimum
monthly rent established by the parties is adequate.
Lessee's Liability for Damages Where There is no Substantial
Minimum Rent
Where there is no substantial minimum rent reserved, however,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 378, 233 P.2d at 588.
59. Id. at 380, 233 P.2d at 589; accord, Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg,
234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166 (1964); Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d 538 (Okla.
1958); Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
60. 131 Cal. App. 2d 110, 280 P.2d 104 (1955).
61. Id. at 116-17, 280 P.2d at 108.
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California has adopted the position that there is an implied covenant
that the lessee will use good faith in operating the demised premises for
the entire term of the lease in order to produce gross sales or profits on
which percentage rent can be computed. The leading case is Lippman
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,6" in which the Supreme Court of California
ruled that the term "minimum monthly rent" has no static legal signifi-
cance, and that its meaning can be determined only by reference to
the circumstances under which the lease was executed. 63 Accordingly,
the court ruled that parol evidence was admissible to show that the
parties to the lease did not consider the guaranteed minimum monthly
rent of $285 a substantially adequate minimum where the lessor had
been induced to spend $75,000 modifying the premises to meet Sears'
needs.0 4 Acknowledging that the lease contained only a permissive use
clause,"5 and not a covenant to continue to use the premises for the
specified purpose, the court nevertheless concluded that the lessee must
have impliedly covenanted to use good faith to insure continuation of the
percentage rental agreed upon in the lease. 6 For breach of the implied
covenant, defendant was liable for damages.
The Lippman decision added to the already existing criteria of
"substantial minimum rent" and "new business" the third criterion of
good faith in the conduct of the business. In Lippman, the lessee had
ceased to use the premises for any purpose except storage, paying only
the guaranteed minimum rent. The court found this a manifest viola-
tion of the defendant's implied obligations under the lease, especially
when the evidence showed that the guaranteed minimum monthly rent
was intended by the parties only to secure approval for the lease from
the "main office," and that Lippman's profit on the venture was to be
62. 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
63. Id. at 145, 280 P.2d at 780-81.
64. Id. at 145-46, 280 P.2d at 781.
65. General clauses providing that premises are to be used for a specified purpose
are often construed as being permissive rather than restrictive in nature. Under such
construction, the lessee can use the premises for virtually any purpose, or not use them,
with impunity. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944), where a
lease of premises for the purpose of a garage was held to be permissive and descrip-
tive. Accord, Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580
(1954).
66. 44 Cal. 2d at 143-45, 28 P.2d at 781; accord, Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's
Shoe Stores, 203 La. 316, 14 So. 2d 10 (1943); Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d
356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); cf. Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 P.
1022 (1928), where defendant relocated two important departments of his business
into an adjoining building, and was held liable for the percentage of the business done
in the new building. The court argued that the defendant had leased an established
business from the plaintiff, and could not avoid paying the rent by dividing the business,
especially where the only access to the adjoining building was through the leased prem-
ises. Id. at 390, 270 P. at 1024.
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derived from the percentage rental feature of the lease."7
Although the rule of a substantially adequate minimum rent, as
laid down in Cousins v. Hastings, remained in effect, the emphasis
shifted to the intent of the parties and to a determination of whether
the guaranteed minimum monthly rent, though substantial, represented a
fair rental value for the property. Consequently, when Professional
Building, Inc. v. Anita Frocks, Inc.18 arose, the court had little difficulty
in finding that plaintiff had stated a good cause of action for an ac-
counting of percentage rent due, even though a minimum rent of
$700 per month was reserved in the lease.6 9 Whether or not the
guaranteed minimum monthly rent is adequate is a question of fact,
contingent on the intent of the parties. If it is not adequate, the lessee
impliedly covenants to use the premises in a manner that will produce
percentage rent.70
The Efficacy of the Substantial Minimum Rent Doctrine
It is questionable, of course, whether this shift in emphasis is suf-
ficient to protect the lessor's interests. Certainly, those cases that
have considered the percentage rent as a bonus have failed to grasp the
full significance of a percentage lease agreement. From the lessor's
standpoint, a percentage lease is desirable because it affords a means of
insuring a sufficient income to meet monthly operating expenses while
attracting tenants of known merchandising power,' 1 who can lease the
premises for a sum roughly proportionate to its revenue-producing po-
tential. 2 The essential question, then, is not whether the guaranteed
minimum monthly rent is nominal, substantial or adequate. Rather,
the inquiry must be whether the minimum rent is the amount the
parties contracted for as the rental on the property, given their mutual
understanding that a business would be conducted on the premises.
To apply any other standard in determining the lessee's obligations un-
der the lease is to deprive the lessor of the benefits of his contract. To
hold that a lessor intended to accept as an adequate return on his in-
vestment a fixed minimum rent, when that rent is not the equivalent of
the premises' fair rental value, clearly defeats the purpose of the lease. 3
67. 44 Cal. 2d at 140, 280 P.2d at 778.
68. 178 Cal. App. 2d 276, 2 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960).
69. Cf. Owens v. Geary Drive-In Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 936, 28 Cal. Rptr. 475
(1963).
70. 178 Cal. App. 2d at 279, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
71. See GRUEN & SMITH 191; Hemingway at 2-3, 13.
72. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.66, at 320 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see
Colbourn, pt. I1, at 59; 44 CORNELL L.Q. 251 (1959), where the author also suggests that
in most cases the lessor should be allowed a return commensurate with the value of
the demised premises to the lessee, rather than the fair rental value of the property.
Id. at 254.
73. See Landis at 220-21 n.48, suggesting that elimination of the percentage
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In this respect, it is proper that the emphasis be on the intent of the
parties, determined, if necessary, through the use of parol evidence.74
But such evidence should be directed toward determining not whether
the parties considered the minimum rent adequate, but whether they
intended it to be, at the lessee's discretion, the only rent on the property.
In most cases, it is reasonably certain that both parties intended the
lessee to conduct a business in accordance with sound business prin-
ciples, and to refrain from doing anything substantially certain to im-
pair gross sales.75 The minimum rent is rarely regarded as an adequate
rent; it is the lessor's protection should the lessee's efforts fail to produce
sufficient gross sales to require payment of percentage rent.
The requirement established by the courts that the lessee use good
faith in his efforts at least provides a standard not previously used by
which the lessee's duty can be measured under a percentage lease
agreement. So long as the tenant uses good faith and attempts to con-
duct a profitable enterprise in accordance with accepted business prac-
tices, neither party should have cause to complain.
Unquestionably, a good faith standard is extremely difficult to
apply, especially in business tenancies. Perhaps for this reason the
courts, in many instances, have been hesitant to impose upon a re-
luctant tenant an obligation to remain in business.76 For such a require-
ment, once imposed, necessarily requires a determination of whether the
lessee exercised good faith when he took steps that resulted in the re-
rent violates the intent of the parties whenever the minimum rent is less than a reason-
able fixed rent for the premises, thereby giving the lessee an economic advantage
when business is adverse, even though the minimum rent is substantial and covers the
lessor's operating expenses.
74. See text accompanying note 64 supra. The use of parol evidence is further
necessitated by the fact that often, in percentage lease agreements, the express terms of
the lease may be vague or equivocal, either because the parties failed to reach agree-
ment on a particular point, or to insure that neither finds himself bound by unaccept-
ably restrictive provisions.
75. Several courts, including California, have adopted this approach. Lippman
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Seggebruch v. Stosor,
309 Ill. App. 385, 33 N.E.2d 159 (1941); Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 203
La. 316, 14 So. 2d 10 (1943); Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939); cf. Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App. 2d 63, 291 P.2d 111 (1955). But
several commentators have suggested that such criteria cannot be applied because a
lessee may not have the same interest in producing a high volume of gross sales that
the lessor does. That is, while a lessor's interest will usually be in increasing gross
sales, a tenant may find it more profitable to maintain a curtailed business, thereby
reducing operational costs with a concomitant reduction in gross sales and the amount
of percentage rent owing. E.g., Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939). See Landis at 219; Tulley at 861. A suggested solution is the compu-
tation of percentage rent on the basis of profitable gross sales. 43 CHAIN SToRE AGE-
ExEcunva EDITON, July 1967, at 40.
76. See Comment, The Lessee's Obligations Under a Percentage Lease, 60 Nw.
U.L. R v. 677, 684 (1965).
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duction or elimination of percentage rent under the terms of the lease.
It also poses the considerable problem of whether a tenant must con-
tinue to operate a losing business, when such business produces a suffi-
cient volume of sales to require payment of the percentage rent.
Manifestly, uniform interpretation and enforcement of such vague
criteria as "legitimate business judgment" or "standard business prac-
tices" is nearly impossible.77 Fortunately, some courts have never-
theless imposed such standards when it appeared that failure to do so
would result in substantial injustice. In such cases, the lessor has re-
covered damages for the loss of percentage rent due to the lessee's
breach of the implied covenant.78 In the absence of equitable relief,
this appears to be the only desirable result. At the minimum, the
lessor should have damages when the lessee arbitrarily takes measures
which reduce the lessor's income from his property.
The obvious reluctance of the courts to imply such a covenant in
every case, however, has led to widespread agreement among the com-
mentators that the lessor's best protection is to include in the lease a
carefully worded, express covenant that the lessee will continually use
the premises to merchandise his products for the duration of the lease.7"
There is also agreement, however, that specific performance of such
covenants is not to be expected."s As pointed out by Benjamin Pollack,
in a speech to shopping center operators: "Courts rarely go so far as
[the Dover case] in ordering people to perform affirmative acts."'" For
this reason, the commentators have also suggested that a provision for
77. Compare Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d
580 (1954). and Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950), with Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955),
and Simihawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 111. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (1964).
78. Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955);
Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Prop., Inc., 150 Fla. 132, 7 So. 2d 342 (1942);
Simihawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 111. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (1964); Slidell Inv. Co.
v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 251 La. 387, 204 So.
2d 572 (1967). But see Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d
248 (1964).
79. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES, PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM
58 (5th ed. 1959); ABA, Report 294; Goldstein, Practical Aspects of Real Estate
Developments: Illustrated by a Shopping Center Project, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 119, 130; Kranzdorf, Problems of the Developer, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 173, 181-82;
Tulley 860-61; cf. Pollack, Shopping Center Leases, 9 KAN. L. REv. 379, 382 (1961).
But see Colbourn, pt. II, at 62. See also Landis at 230-31, who suggests that such a
covenant should include express provisions for relief in the event the lessee's business
proves unprofitable.
80. ABA, Report 285. "Regardless of how firmly a lease provides that the tenant
will keep its store operating during the lease term, courts are reluctant to grant an af-
firmative injunction requiring the tenant to stay in business because of the practical
difficulties of supervision." Id. at 295.
81. 43 CHAIN STORE AGE-EXEcuTIvE EDITION, July 1967, at 40.
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liquidated damages may be appropriate.82 Such a provision would
make the lessee liable, for example, for a sum equal to the percentage
rent paid during a specified preceding period, plus an additional sum
predicated on the expected growth of the shopping center and the loss of
pulling power.
Damages in California: An Adequate Remedy?
By extending to the lessor the protection afforded by an implied
covenant to remain in business and damages for its breach, California
has placed itself among the more liberal courts in construing percent-
age leases. The same progressiveness, however, has not characterized
her decrees of specific performance, and it is doubtful that California
will specifically enforce a shopping center lease in the near future.
The first difficulty in obtaining specific performance of a covenant
to remain in business, either express or implied, is that under comparable
circumstances the courts have found monetary damages to be an ade-
quate remedy. 3 Damages in the Lippman case were based on an ex-
press contract provision that the lessee would pay the average monthly
rental during the preceding twelve months, or the difference between
that amount and the best rent obtainable by the lessor, if the lessee
abandoned the premises. The court indicated this remedy was being
applied because the lease provision was, in effect, one for liquidated
damages that, by implication, would be applicable in the event the lessee
ceased to conduct the agreed business8 4 In the absence of such a pro-
vision, the court stated that the proper measure of damages would be
the amount the lessor would receive as percentage rental had the lessee
conducted his business in a proper manner.85 Hence, the case stands
as authority both for the award of damages for breach of a percentage
lease, and for the enforcement of liquidated damage provisions when
included in the lease.
Whether the Lippman formula is applicable in an action for a
shopping center tenant's breach of a covenant to remain in business,
however, is not yet certain. The Lippman case did not involve a shop-
ping center, only a single business tenancy, and therefore may not be
controlling. Application of such a formula to ascertain the damage
suffered by the remaining tenants in the shopping center, who suffer a
loss of potential business, and the consequent loss to the lessor of per-
centage rental derived from that business, will not be easily accom-
82. ABA, Report at 295; Kranzdorf, Problems of the Developer, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
173, 191; Landis at 238. See Tulley at 904 for suggested liquidated damage clause.
83. See Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
84. Id. at 146, 280 P.2d at 781.
85. Id.
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plished. As noted, 86 however, at least two courts have impliedly held
that such damages can be ascertained,"' presumably on the basis of the
tenant's past performance and expert testimony.
Where the lessee ceases to do business in the demised premises
and commences operation in another location, there is a more substantial
basis for determining damages. The business done at the new location
provides a standard by which expected gross sales within the shopping
center can be established.8 On the basis of these figures, expert testi-
mony could perhaps establish just how much actual business the shop-
ping center lost by reason of the withdrawal of the merchant. In
many cases, however, especially where the enterprise is losing money,
the lessee will not establish a new or competing business, but will
simply terminate his operation. Frequently, paying the guaranteed
minimum monthly rent on a defunct business will be less costly than
attempting to continue a losing enterprise.
It is not necessary, of course, that plaintiff prove the amount of his
damages with exactitude. The California courts have been relatively
liberal in permitting recovery of future profits and similar damages that
cannot be easily ascertained, 89 provided the fact of actual damage can
be established.9 ° Consequently, it has been held that prospective in-
come from an established business may be a proper element of dam-
ages,9 though there is only a reasonable basis for its computation and
the result reached is only an approximation.
9 2
Assuming the lessor's monetary loss can be estimated with some
degree of accuracy, the question then becomes whether this is an ade-
quate remedy. It must be conceded that in those cases where a smaller
merchant breaches his covenant to remain in business, damages prob-
ably are adequate. The withdrawal of an ordinary tenant is not likely
86. See text accompanying notes 37-39 and 45-46 supra.
87. See Security Builders, Inc. v. Southwest Drug Co., 244 Miss. 877, 147 So. 2d
635 (1962); Tulip Realty Co. v. City Prod. Corp., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 629 (C.P. Phila.
County 1962); cf. Back v. J.C. Penney, Co., 232 Ark. 5, 334 S.W.2d 672 (1960). But
see Well v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). See also
M.N. Landau Stores, Inc. v. Daigle, 157 Me. 253, 170 A.2d 673 (1961).
88. See Simihawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (1964);
Slidell Inv. Co. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1967); cf. Stop &
Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964).
89. See Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Hoag v. Jenan, 86
Cal. App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948); Skupen v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 33 Cal. App.
2d 392, 91 P.2d 910 (1939).
90. Hildebrand v. Stonecrest Corp., 174 Cal. App. 2d 158, 167, 344 P.2d 378,
384 (1959); Flagg v. Andrew Williams Stores, Inc., 127 Cal. App. 2d 165, 173-74, 273
P.2d 294, 299 (1954); Allen v. Gardner, 126 Cal. App. 2d 335, 340, 272 P.2d 99,
102 (1954).
91. Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948).
92. Allen v. Gardner, 126 Cal. App. 2d 335, 272 P.2d 99 (1954).
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to have the impact on a shopping center that the recanting of a key
tenant would have, and California's liberal position with respect to re-
covery of future profits is probably sufficient to meet this exigency. In-
deed, in view of the past difficulties landlords have encountered in ob-
taining any remedy,13 perhaps damages are all that can be expected.
Where a key tenant is abandoning the premises, however, the lessor
encounters problems of far greater magnitude than the loss of the
lessee's percentage rent. In such a case, damages cannot be considered
an adequate remedy.94 Without the requisite key tenants, the shopping
center lacks the pulling power necessary to sustain the other merchants
or to preserve the shopping center as a single entity sufficiently broad to
satisfy consumer needs. 95 It was perhaps for this reason that one
writer, in criticizing the Dover case, suggested that forfeiture of the
premises, allowing the developer to relet to a comparable business, would
be an appropriate remedy.9" In some situations, however, the developer
may find himself unable to secure a satisfactory replacement tenant, or
he may be confronted with the problem that occurred in Lilac Variety,
Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co.97  In that case, the developer was unable to
compel a defendant lessee to remain as a tenant after a key supermarket
had ceased conducting business in the shopping center. The super-
market had abandoned its building, using the premises only for storage
and paying the rent as it became due. The court refused to find that
the lessor's express obligation to the lessee under the lease, to keep the
supermarket as a tenant in the shopping center,9 8 was satisfied by the
supermarket's payment of rent and use of the premises for storage. The
defendant lessee was therefore permitted to depart with impunity, the
court stating in support of its conclusion:
We think it is common knowledge that the volume of pedestrian
traffic at the site of a retail merchandising business is a factor
which affects the gross sales potential of the business ....
93. E.g., cases cited note 22 supra.
94. Cf. Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965).
In that case, the court held: "The question, in determining the adequacy of plaintiffs'
remedy at law, is not whether they have some remedy at law apart from the contract,
but whether their remedy at law upon the contract itself . . . is sufficient ....
[T]he fact that plaintiffs are entitled at law to reimbursement . . . is not dispositive
of the issue of whether their remedy at law. . . is adequate." Id. at 474, 46 Cal. Rptr.
at 178.
95. See GRUEN & SMITH 52, 190-92; Hemingway at 2-3.
96. Note, 22 U. PIrr. L. REv. 789 (1961). But see Shannon v. Cavanaugh, 12
Cal. App. 434, 107 P. 574 (1910); see note 94 supra.
97. 383 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
98. By virtue of its superior bargaining position a key tenant may be able to ob-
tain terms in his lease that permit his cessation of business under specified circum-
stances. As an inducement to other tenants, however, the developer may have to
covenant that certain stores (i.e., the key tenants) will be tenants in the shopping cen-
ter. The Lilac Variety case arose under such a lease provision.
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Plainly the parties intended that a supermarket should be in oper-
ation during the term of the lease. We find it impossible to be-
lieve . . . it was intended that the particular lease provision . . .
would be satisified if A.C.F. Wrigley Stores should continue to
pay rent on an idle store after discontinuing operation of the
supermarket. 99
Manifestly, a monetary value cannot always be put on an express
covenant to remain in business. A covenant may be of such im-
portance, and the ramifications of its breach so great, that it may be
impossible to estimate its value by any pecuniary standard. 100 A lessee's
covenant to remain in business in the shopping center appears to be such
a covenant, and in such a case, plaintiff's remedy should more properly
be in equity.1 1
Obstacles to Specific Performance in California
Although the California courts might be persuaded that damages
are an inadequate remedy for a key tenant's breach of a covenant to
operate in the demised premises, it would be quite another matter to
persuade them to extend equitable relief as far as the New Jersey court
did in the Dover case. Unfortunately, California has been slow to
accept the principle presently espoused-that equity should act wher-
ever the difficulties of judicial supervision are not extreme when com-
pared to the inadequacy of the plaintiff's remedy at law. 102 Conse-
quently, a shopping center lessor can anticipate considerable difficulty
in overcoming the traditional defenses to an action for specific per-
formance.
Personal Service and Employment Contracts
Because of its code provisions' 03 California will not decree specific
99. Id. at 196. It is not inconceivable that an abandoned shopping center
could be the ultimate result.
100. See Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super.
384, 164 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1960); cf. Porporato v. Devincenzi, 261 Cal. App. 2d
670, 68 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1968).
101. In Wehen v. Lundgaard, 41 Cal. App. 2d 610, 107 P.2d 491 (1940), the
court's language appeared to be peculiarly adapted to the breach of a shopping center
lease. Although specific performance was denied in that case, the court stated that
specific performance would be a proper remedy "where there are present circumstances
in view of which a judgment for damages would fall short of the redress which plain-
tiff's situation demands, as for instance where by nonperformance of the contract the
[plaintiff] will be greatly embarassed and impeded in his business plans or in a loss of
profits which a jury cannot estimate with any degree of certainty ...... Id. at 613,
107 P.2d at 493 (emphasis added).
102. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 33, at 2814 (7th ed. 1960).
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390: "The following obligations cannot be specifically
enforced: 1. An obligation to render personal service; 2. An obligation to employ
another in personal service ....
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performance of a contract calling for personal services. For instance, in
Rautenberg v. Westland,' the court of appeals refused to specifically
enforce an agreement to transfer stock, when by the terms of the agree-
ment both plaintiff and defendant were to exchange services in the con-
duct of sundry businesses. The court emphasized that the "agreement
obligates the individual parties to perform acts requiring an exercise
of personal judgment and a degree of cooperation in making the several
enterprises successful . ...",05
Similarly, in Moklofsky v. Moklofsky,' 06 the court declined to
specifically enforce an agreement to convey property, partly because the
plaintiff could not be compelled to personally complete construction of
an apartment and outside staircase as required by the provisions of the
agreement. 107 And ,in Coykendall v. Jackson, 0 8 the court summarily
denied specific performance of an executory contract for an exclusive
selling agency, holding that contracts expressly indicating reliance on the
personal abilities of a party are beyond the limits of specific enforce-
ment.
It is doubtful, however, that California would refuse to specifi-
cally enforce a covenant to remain in business on the basis that it was a
contract of employment requiring the personal services of the lessee.
Despite the extensive controls that a developer necessarily retains over
the lessee's business in a shopping center, percentage lease agreements
have consistently been held to involve nothing more than a landlord-
tenant relationship.' 0 9 Although some commentators have urged the
construction of such leases as joint ventures, or even partnerships, these
suggestions have been rejected by the courts."10
Accordingly, California has properly concluded that the lease of a
business is not a contract of employment requiring personal services.
In Pike v. Hayden,"' the court held that the fact that the lessees were
required under the terms of the contract to keep a service station and
cafe open 24 hours a day and to conduct the business therein in
an efficient manner was not a bar to specific performance of an
agreement to lease, since the contract did not call for the personal
services of the lessee and was not a contract of employment.
There have been comparable earlier decisions. In George v. Wes-
104. 227 Cal. App. 2d 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1964).
105. Id. at 572, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
106. 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
107. Id. at 262, 179 P.2d at 630.
108. 17 Cal. App. 2d 729, 62 P.2d 746 (1936).
109. I AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3.5, at 185-86 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
110. Id. Such suggestions are improper because shopping center landlords do not
share their tenants' business losses.
111. 97 Cal. App. 2d 606, 218 P.2d 578 (1950).
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ton,' 12 the court held that a lease was specifically enforceable even
though it contained plaintiffs covenant to perform drilling operations
on the demised land. Since the covenant ran to plaintiff's heirs and
assigns, it did not require the personal services of any particular indi-
vidual. And in Harms v. Reed,"13 the court held that the contract was
not one of employment, even though the plaintiff was obliged under its
terms to contribute services in the maintenance and operation of prop-
erty purchased for speculative purposes, and to act as a broker for the
sale of the property. The court indicated that a finding requiring the
plaintiff to continue such service did not contravene the statute pre-
cluding specific performances of employment contracts." 4
While an individual lessee personally managing a small business
could perhaps attempt to invoke Civil Code section 3390 and the tra-
ditional arguments against involuntary servitude, 15 these arguments are
clearly not applicable to the national chain and department stores.
Though a percentage lease agreement in a shopping center contem-
plates a degree of cooperation between all the parties involved, the
lessee does not usually contract to personally perform any of the duties
imposed by the lease. Specific performance, therefore, should not be
denied on this basis.
Mutuality of Remedy
Although it has been frequently criticized," 6 the strict doctrine of
mutuality of remedy remains in the California Civil Code' 17 and is con-
sistently followed." 8  Unless the plaintiff can be coerced to specifically
perform his obligations under the lease or contract that he seeks to en-
force, his remedy must be at law. Thus, in Moklofsky, 15 plaintiff was
unable to obtain specific performance of his mother's contract to con-
112. 26 Cal. App. 2d 256, 79 P.2d 110 (1938).
113. 73 Cal. App. 2d 853, 167 P.2d 747 (1946).
114. Id. at 862, 167 P.2d 751.
115. See W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 165-66 (2d ed. 1956);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379, comment d (1932).
116. E.g., Comment, Mutuality of Remedy in California Under Civil Code Section
3386, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1430 (1968); Comment, Specific Performance: The California
Doctrine of Mutuality in Suits for Specific Performance, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 492
(1940).
117. CAL. Cmr. CODE § 3386 provides: "Neither party to an obligation can be
compelled specifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has performed, or
is compellable specifically to perform, everything to which the former is entitled ...
either completely or nearly so ......
118. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861 (1925); see Landis v. Blom-
quist, 257 Cal. App. 2d 533, 64 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1967); Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965); Rautenberg v. Westland, 227 Cal. App. 2d
566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1964).
119. Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
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vey realty because he himself could not be compelled to complete the
required construction.
The doctrine of negative mutuality, however, should not pose a
substantial obstacle to obtaining equitable relief in a shopping center
lease. Civil Code section 3392 provides that specific performance will
not be compelled where the party seeking equitable relief has not per-
formed his obligations, except where the failure of performance is im-
material or fully compensable."'2 This section overcomes many of the
obstacles presented by the doctrine of negative mutuality where the
plaintiff has substantially performed. 2' It is well settled in California
that the remedy need not be mutual at the time of the contract, but
merely at the time specific performance is sought. 22 Hence, where the
shopping center developer, having furnished the demised premises and
otherwise fulfilled his covenants under the lease, seeks to specifically en-
force his lessee's covenant to remain in business, relief cannot properly
be denied under the doctrine of negative mutuality. 2 3  In addition, an
agreement to lease is specifically enforceable by the lessee in California,
because of the historical treatment of land as being unique. 2 4 Thus,
in Pike v. Hayden, 25 the court did not find the lessee's agreement to
operate a business on the leased premises a sufficient obstacle to pre-
vent specific performance of the lessor's agreement to lease. Lack of
mutuality did not prevent specific performance, the court held, because
whatever lack of mutuality existed resulted solely from the lessor's fail-
ure to fulfill his obligation.
2 6
Judicial Supervision
By far the most difficult obstacle to surmount in California, and
the lessee's best defense in an action for specific performance of a
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3392 provides: "Specific performance cannot be en-
forced in favor of a party who has not fully and fairly performed all the conditions
precedent on his part to the obligation of the other party, except where his failure to
perform is only partial, and either entirely immaterial, or capable of being fully com-
pensated, in which case specific performance may be compelled ......
121. E.g., Jones v. Clark, 19 Cal. 2d 156, 119 P.2d 731 (1941); Thurber v. Meves,
119 Cal. 35, 50 P. 1063 (1897); Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 173 (1965); Stone v. Burke, 110 Cal. App. 2d 748, 244 P.2d 51 (1952); Van
Fossen v. Yager, 65 Cal. App. 2d 591, 151 P.2d 14 (1944). See Note, Mutuality of
Remedy in California Under Civil Code Section 3386, 19 HASTiNGS L.. 1430, 1434.
122. Ellis v. Mihelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1963).
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3392; see Ellis v. Mihelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7,
32 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1963); cf. Shannon v. Cavanaugh, 12 Cal. App. 434, 107 P.
574 (1910).
124. Remmers v. Ciciliot, 59 Cal. App. 2d 113, 120, 138 P.2d 306, 310 (1943);
see Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965); cf. Dean v.
Bower, 119 Cal. App. 412, 6 P.2d 580 (1932).
125. 97 Cal. App. 2d 606, 218 P.2d 578 (1950).
126. Id. at 613, 218 P.2d at 583.
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covenant to remain in business, is that posed by the continuing re-
luctance of the California courts to enforce a contract requiring continu-
ing acts, extending over a long period of time. It is settled beyond
dispute that California courts
will not decree the specific performance of contracts which, by
their terms, stipulate for a succession of acts whose performance
cannot be consummated by one transaction inasmuch as such con-
tinuing performance requires protracted supervision and direc-
tion.12
7
A significant case is that of Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug
Co.,128 where plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant drug manu-
facturer from selling to plaintiff's competitors in violation of an exclusive
selling agency. The California Supreme Court held that performance of
the implied affirmative covenant, that plaintiff would purchase drugs
from the defendant and resell them at certain prices, could not be
compelled since enforcing such a contract over an indefinite perod of
time would impose upon the court a duty impossible to perform.129
Since the affirmative acts could not be enforced, the injunction issued
by the court below was set aside as violating the doctrine of mutuality
of remedy. Unless the performance of the contract can be embraced in
one order and is immediately enforceable, specific performance will be
denied, for the court will not decree specific performance that can only
be effectuated by the constant personal supervision of the court. 30
In determining what is encompassed within this prohibition, the
courts have not been entirely consistent. Paving a parking lot in accord-
ance with the terms of a contract was held not to require a succession
of acts in Gale v. Seymour.' Since the construction of a parking lot
was but a single act, which would not require the court to exercise special
skill, knowledge or judgment in supervising its completion, specific per-
formance was a proper remedy. And in Herzog v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad, 32 the court indicated that it would consider a de-
127. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d
300, 304, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148, 159 (1967) (automobile distributorship); accord, Long
Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698 (1939) (selling
agency); Whipple Road Quarry Co. v. L.C. Smith Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 214, 249 P.2d
854 (1952) (operating a quarry).
128. 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698 (1939). The exclusive agency had been in
effect for more than 25 years at the time the action was commenced.
129. Id. at 171-72, 88 P.2d at 705. Compare Fleischer v. James Drug Stores,
Inc., 1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948).
130. Id. at 171, 88 P.2d at 705. In denying a petition for rehearing, the court
stated that recovery of damages would not be barred solely because they "may not be
susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent, or difficult of ascertain-
ment ...... 13 Cal. 2d 172, 174, 89 P.2d 386, 388.
131. 91 Cal. App. 2d 727, 205 P.2d 752 (1949).
132. 153 Cal. 496, 95 P. 898 (1908). Due to plaintiff's defective complaint,
there was no decree of specific performance.
[Vol. 21
SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
cree of specific performance of a covenant to construct and maintain a
railroad station on plaintiffs property if plaintiff were able to demon-
strate that the contract was just, fair, and for adequate consideration,
with no adequate remedy at law.'
In Bakersfield Country Club v. Pacific Water Co., 3 4 where pipes
were to be installed in accordance with an existing plan, specific per-
formance could be decreed since it could be accomplished in one general
transaction with a minimum of delay. The court indicated that the rule
against specific performance of a contract involving successive acts over
a long period of time did not apply because the obligor was ready and
willing to perform.' 5 Nevertheless, Gale v. Seymour' 6 was cited as
authority for the decree, suggesting that, despite the language of the
court, the same result might have been reached had the defendant been
unwilling to perform.
37
More recently, it was held in Nadell & Co. v. Grasso3 8 that an
injunction would lie to prevent a defendant from selling jars of fruit
salad in their original containers. Such acts were in violation of a
covenant under which the defendant was bound to remove the salad
from the containers, and return the containers and lids to the plaintiff.
The court proceeded on the belief that since performance of the affirm-
ative acts could be accomplished in a "very few transactions,"' an
injunction to prevent breach of the implied negative covenant did not
contravene Civil Code section 3423. This result necessarily required
the court to conclude that had specific performance been the remedy
sought, it would have been granted.
40
Just how much is included within the "single act" or "very few
transactions" criteria established by these decisions is not yet certain.
133. Id. at 500-02, 95 P. at 899-900.
134. 192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1961).
135. Id. at 539, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
136. 91 Cal. App. 2d 727, 205 P.2d 752 (1949).
137. 192 Cal. App. 2d at 539, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
138. 175 Cal. App. 2d 420, 346 P.2d 505 (1959). But see Lubin v. Lubin, 144
Cal. App. 2d 781, 302 P.2d 49 (1956). In Lubin, the court held that a promise to
make periodic premium payments on a life insurance policy was not specifically en-
forceable.
139. 175 Cal. App. 2d at 426, 346 P.2d at 509.
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3386. A similar interpretation must be given Pike v.
Hayden, 97 Cal. App. 2d 606, 218 P.2d 578 (1950). Since under CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3386 there can be no specific performance unless there is mutuality of remedy,
the court apparently concluded that, were the parties reversed, the lessor could have
specifically enforced the lessee's agreement to operate the gas station and cafe. How-
ever, the court did not consider the difficulties of supervising such performance, appar-
ently because the issue was not raised by counsel. The case is further enervated by
the fact that the action was to enforce an agreement to lease, where specific perform-
ance is often given as a matter of course. See, e.g., cases cited note 124 supra.
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In Moklofsky,' 4' the court refused to specifically enforce the contract
partly because it called for personal services requiring a succession of
acts and therefore lacked the mutuality required by Civil Code section
3386.142 As Witkin points out, however, the contract was not for per-
sonal services, since both parties probably contemplated construction of
the apartment and staircase by any skilled person. 43  The Moklofsky
case was distinguished in Gale v. Seymour14 as a case where specific
performance was properly denied because the duty of performance did
in fact extend over a long period of time and might require supervision
by the court. 145  If this be true, as it appears to be, the Moklofsky
decision is difficult to reconcile with the holdings in Harms v. Reed146
and George v. Weston 4 ' that such acts can be specifically enforced. It
was clear, in any event, to the court deciding Gale v. Seymour that
while paving a parking lot was a single act and could be specifically
enforced, completing construction of a staircase was more than a single
act, and therefore unenforceable.
1 48
The more recent decisions confirm the interpretation apparently
given the Moklofsky case in Gale v. Seymour, especially where the
plaintiff is not seeking to compel the conveyance of property in accord-
ance with an agreement to lease or sell. The decisions in Whipple Road
Quarry Co. v. L.C. Smith Co.14 9 and in Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp.5 ' both strongly reassert the doctrine that the
court will not undertake judicial supervision over a long period of time.
Thus, in Whipple Road Quarry, the court would not undertake to com-
pel the defendant to operate a quarry, sell to the public at prevailing
rates, pay royalties to the lessor, or install equipment, since extensive
judicial supervision would be required to make such a decree effective.
From these cases it is apparent that while specific relief may lie
for relatively simple acts of limited duration,'' the courts will not order
specific performance of either simple1 2 or more complex acts
53 of
141. Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
142. Id. at 262, 179 P.2d at 630.
143. 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 36, at 2816 (7th ed. 1960).
144. 91 Cal. App. 2d 727, 205 P.2d 752 (1949).
145. Id. at 728, 205 P.2d at 753.
146. 73 Cal. App. 2d 853, 167 P.2d 747 (1946).
147. 26 Cal. App. 2d 256, 79 P.2d 110 (1938).
148. 91 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 205 P.2d at 752-53.
149. 114 Cal. App. 2d 214, 249 P.2d 854 (1952).
150. 255 Cal. App. 2d 300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967).
151. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420, 346 P.2d 505 (1959); Gale v.
Seymour, 91 Cal. App. 2d 727, 205 P.2d 752 (1949); cf. Bakersfield Country Club v.
Pacific Water Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1961).
152. See Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 781, 302 P.2d 49 (1956).
153. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d
300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967); Whipple Road Quarry Co. v. L.C. Smith Co., 114 Cal.
App. 2d 214, 249 P.2d 854 (1952).
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extended duration. Exceptions will be made, however, for agreements
involving the conveyance of land,' and equitable relief will extend
somewhat beyond the narrow confines that have historically existed.
It would appear that as long as the duty to be performed can be accom-
plished within a relatively short period of time, by one generic act as
opposed to related but not identical acts of indefinite duration, the
courts will not arbitrarily deny specific performance. Hence, a con-
tract to pave a parking lot can be enforced since the simple activity of
paving and grading can be quickly accomplished with a minimum of
supervision.' 55 This principle would also permit specific performance
of the contract in the Bakersfield Country Club case,'56 even if the
defendant were unwilling to perform. The availability of the requisite
materials and an existing plan would allow accomplishment of the con-
tractual duty to install the pipes with a minimum of delay. Similarly,
the return of empty salad containers prior to the sale of their contents
can be enforced, especially where the containers are already in the
control of the defendant;1 57 whereas the continual sale of goods to
multiple purchasers would not be compelled.5 8  Where the contract
calls for cooperation between the parties, or discretion in performing a
number of separate acts necessary to the successful operation of a busi-
ness enterprise, specific performance clearly should not be expected in
California.'59
The conduct of a business in a shopping center, of course, falls
within this latter category. The success of a shopping center requires
not only a degree of skill in merchandising techniques, but also a
significant amount of cooperation between the landlord and his tenants,
as well as among the various tenants themselves.6 0 In view of its past
record, it is unlikely that California would compel a merchant to conduct
a business over an extended period of time. The duty of enforcing such
a decree would be one the California courts are likely to find impos-
sible to perform. The lessee in a shopping center consequently should
expect to avoid specific performance of his covenant to remain in busi-
ness by invoking this defense.
154. See Pike v. Hayden, 97 Cal. App. 2d 606, 218 P.2d 578 (1950).
155. Gale v. Seymour, 91 Cal. App. 2d 727, 205 P.2d 752 (1949).
156. Bakersfield Country Club v. Pacific Water Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13
Cal. Rptr. 573 (1961).
157. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420, 346 P.2d 505 (1959).
158. Cf. Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d
698 (1939); Associated Oil Co. v. Myers, 217 Cal. 297, 18 P.2d 668 (1933).
159. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d
300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967).
160. See GRUEN & SmInH 255-56 for a brief discussion of merchants associations,
which are the principle organs through which the necessary cooperation is effected.
Participation is often mandatory. See also Moorestown Manag., Inc. v. Moorestown
Bookshop, Inc., 104 NJ. Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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Injunctive Relief Precluded
The difficulties of judicial supervision also preclude granting equit-
able relief indirectly, by means of a prohibitory injunction, as was done
in the Lincoln Tower case.' Subdivision 5 of both Civil Code sec-
tion 3423 and Code of Civil Procedure section 526 expressly provide
that a negative injunction cannot issue to prevent breach of a covenant
whose performance is not specifically enforceable. 1 2  These enact-
ments provide the lessee with an insurmountable defense to a lessor's
action to enjoin the breach of an affirmative covenant to remain in busi-
ness. Thus, in the Long Beach case,' the prohibitory injunction
issued by the court below was set aside, and in Thayer Plymouth Cen-
ter, 64 the court expressly refused to consider a grant of injunctive relief
for the same reason.
There is, of course, the exception contained in the statutes for
unique or extraordinary personal services,' 65 whereby breach of an
affirmative covenant will be enjoined. But it is doubtful that in the
ordinary course of events, a business located in a shopping center could
be brought within this rather narrow exception. In many instances a
comparable business could be found to replace that operated by the
breaching lessee, with an appeal to a similar class of customers and
consequently a similar pulling power. There are, of course, indi-
vidual variances among particular businesses, and customers will often
prefer one of two very nearly identical stores for intangible reasons. It
is doubtful, however, that these differences or preferences would be
sufficient to persuade a court that the lessee's business was unique
or irreplaceable. Unfortunately, since the services must be personal to
be brought within the statutory exception, the provision would be even
less applicable to the key tenants than to the smaller merchants.
The Developing Trends in Equity
California's doctrine of judicial supervision, as evinced in the ju-
dicial decisions, has been characterized as "archaic" by Witkin, who
suggests that equitable relief should be awarded whenever it is feas-
161. Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co., 152 Fla. 54, 12 So. 2d 452
(1943).
162. Both statutes provide in part that: "An injunction cannot be granted ....
"(5) To prevent the breach of a contract ... the performance of which would not
be specifically enforced .... ."CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 526.
163. Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698
(1939).
164. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d
300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967).
165. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(5); CAL. CODE Cv. PROC. § 526(5).
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ible.66 Moreover, it has been urged that in a legal system where
law and equity are merged, there is no good reason for preferring
the legal remedy to the equitable, that the adequacy and practicality
tests do not provide valid criteria for determining whether equitable re-
lief is appropriate in a particular case.'1
7
The trend toward expanding the functions of equitable relief is
unmistakable in other jurisdictions, and the decisions in the Dover and
Lincoln Tower cases are perhaps only the harbingers of what may be-
come a significant development in the law relative to shopping centers.
Evidence of the trend can be found in many cases; particularly signifi-
cant is Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc.65 A retail druggist brought
suit for specific performance of a cooperative purchasing agreement in
which the defendant obligated himself to sell to plaintiff such drugs
and merchandise as he should order, at the discount rates available to
members of the association. Although the contract called for coopera-
tion between the defendant and the participating druggist over an in-
definite period of time, the court decreed specific performance, holding
in part that
the cooperative contract is largely a development of modem busi-
ness, designed to serve competitive needs; and only by equitable
interposition to compel specific performance can adequate redress
be had for the arbitrary denial to a participating member of the
service which is the common right.
69
The court especially emphasized that under such a contract there is no
adequate remedy at law because the subject matter of the contract has
a peculiar value, for which there is no reasonable substitute.
70
Nor have the difficulties of judicial supervision precluded specific
performance of construction contracts.' 7' In City Stores Co. v. Am-
merman,172 plaintiff was able to specifically enforce a developer's con-
tract to construct a building in a shopping center for the plaintiff's retail
store, after plaintiff had assisted in obtaining the requisite zoning for
the shopping center. The court, in holding that there was no means of
determining the pecuniary value of the right to participate in a shopping
166. 4 B. WrrEIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW § 33, at 2814 (7th ed. 1960).
167. McGregor, Remedies, 1963 ANN. SuRv. AM. LAW 267, 283.
168. 1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948).
169. Id. at 148, 62 A.2d at 388.
170. Id. at 148, 62 A.2d at 387.
171. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1422A, at 762-63
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); see In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d
367, 183 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1959) (property improvements), which was an affirmation of
an arbitration decision, rejecting the traditional arguments against judicial supervision;
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E.2d 64 (1955) (construction of vot-
ing machines); cf. Northern Delaware Ind. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d
431 (Del. Ch. 1968). But see Crane v. Roach, 29 Cal. App. 584, 156 P. 375 (1916).
172. 266 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1967).
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center for a long period of time, indicated that although many jurisdic-
tions decline to specifically enforce construction contracts where per-
formance would require supervision of the court,
the better view, and the one which increasingly is being followed
in this country, is that such contracts should be specifically en-
forced unless the difficulties of supervision outweigh the impor-
tance of specific performance .... 173
Similarly, evidence of the trend is found in the Restatement of
Contracts. 74 It is perhaps significant that the Restatement has dis-
missed the strict doctrine of mutuality of remedy in favor of a position
that refuses specific performance only where there is no adequate assur-
ance that the defendant will receive the agreed exchange. 175  California,
as previously noted, has retained the doctrine in its code and has fol-
lowed it consistently. 176  Similarly, the rule that equity will not enjoin
the breach of a negative covenant when the affirmative covenant cannot




If, as Williston points out, the trend is to make the equitable
remedy "more elastic and its application more liberal,"'79 that trend
is not strongly evidenced in California. Whether California will modify
its position on these important issues in the future remains to be seen.
It is apparent, however, that as the law presently exists, the lessor of a
shopping center will be unable to obtain judicially supervised specific
173. Id. at 776.
174. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 371, comment a at 676 (1932): "Increasing
experience has shown that less hesitation on the score of difficulty of enforcement or
length of supervision need be felt, and that attention may well be concentrated on the
character of the contract and the purposes to be attained by granting or refusing spe-
cific enforcement."
175. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 372(1), comment a at 678 (1932).
176. See cases cited note 118 supra.
177. See note 162 supra. These code provisions have been frequently enforced.
See, e.g., Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698
(1939); Poultry Producers, Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 P. 93 (1922); Pacific
Elec. Ry. v. Campbell-Johnston, 153 Cal. 106, 94 P. 623 (1908); Farnum v. Clarke,
148 Cal. 610, 84 P. 166 (1906); Anderson v. Neal Inst. Co., 37 Cal. App. 174, 173
P. 779 (1918).
178. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380(l)(b), at 704-05 (1932), which pro-
vides: "An injunction against the breach of a contractual duty that is negative in
character may be granted . .
"(b) as an indirect mode of specifically enforcing an accompanying affirmative
promise . . . if the affirmative promise is itself one that would be enforced by af-
firmative decree except for the mere practical difficulties of such enforcement."
179. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1418A, at 674
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968).
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enforcement of a lessee's covenant to remain in business for the duration
of the tenancy.
This is not to say that California could not be persuaded to extend
equitable relief were a proper case to arise. In an instance where the
key tenant in a shopping center sought to close his business, and the
lessor could conclusively demonstrate that an acceptable replacement
was unavailable, it might well be argued that a decree such as that
rendered by the New Jersey court could provide the lessor with the only
feasible relief. Such a plea, of course, would have to stress that no
judicial supervision was desired.
Admittedly, the efficacy of such a decree is doubtful since, by its
very nature, a business requires supervision. A recalcitrant tenant is
unlikely to give his business the attention it requires, especially where he
has discovered that he can increase his profits by reducing the volume of
sales, or increase the sales in one store by closing another. Even a de-
cree that the merchant open his business, maintain a sales clerk, and
display a sign, is not likely to serve the interest of the lessor unless there
is sufficient supervision to insure that the lessee maintains competent
sales clerks and an adequate stock of merchandise. But that is no
answer when such a decree is the only relief plaintiff seeks, and he has
no adequate remedy at law. The Dover case reflected an apparent
cognizance of the relative inefficacy of the court's decree, since it
intimated a willingness to exercise at least a modicum of supervision. 80
On the other hand, it may well be to the lessee's advantage to fur-
nish this supervision himself. Confronted with a decree to remain in
business, the tenant may find it necessary to operate efficiently, at least
to the extent necessary to meet his fixed costs. This would obviate
the need for extensive judicial supervision, and perhaps place the court
in the very position that it seeks to maintain by denying specific relief.
Assuming the need for occasional supervision, however, the ques-
tion then becomes whether the difficulties of supervision should be the
criteria for the administration of substantial justice between a lessor who
has no adequate remedy at law and a lessee who has covenanted to
operate a business in the .demised premises for a specified period of
time. Modern equity courts have broadened their view of what is
practicable and feasible in comparable situations 81 and no longer find
the obstacles of judicial supervision so imposing. It is to be hoped that
California will not delay long in recognizing the need for a reconsider-
180. Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384,
394, 164 A.2d 785, 791 (App. Div. 1960).
181. See W. DE FuNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 170-72 (2d ed. 1956);
Van Hecke, Changing Emphasis in Specific Performance, 40 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1961).
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ation of its own position, with a view toward providing in cases of ob-
vious hardship to the lessor a remedy commensurate with the need.
Daniel A. Reicker*
* Member, Second Year Class.
